



Early warning mechanism for conflict prevention in Africa: A study of IGAD in South Sudan

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International Journal of Social Science, Management, Peace and Conflict Research, 2023, 2(1), 1-16

Publication history: Received on 28 September 2023; Revised on October 2, 2023; Accepted on 5 October, 2023

Abstract

In an effort to save lives, the concept of "conflict early warning and reaction" (EWR) was developed leveraging both quantitative and qualitative models by world and regional bodies. The responsiveness of the humanitarian emergencies of the United Nations due to its bureaucratic nature, the 'silo' mentality, and coupled with the highly politicised nature of the UN Security Council. Conversely, regional organisations have been given the responsibility of responding to crises, and they are beginning to build instruments (organs of peace and security) with the competence to do so. This study further queries the efficacy of EWR. While some regional organisations, notably in Africa, have established EWR procedures with the help of donor organisations, others, notably in Asia, have avoided making any such moves. Yet, there is a dilemma because early warning systems rarely lead to prompt preventative measures. So, it is necessary to assess whether or not conflict EWR is useful for effective practice in light of the available empirical evidence. This study aims to provide a comprehensive review of the effect of early warning mechanisms on conflict management with a focus on the African Union Mission in South Sudan. This study examines the conditions they might be a valuable instrument for promoting peace and security within regional organisations. A qualitative study based on secondary data. Results from the study found that among the most pressing issues facing the IGAD region are those related to conflict early warning, such as youth unemployment, poorly managed electoral processes, ethnic polarisation, and competition over land, and natural resources. This study therefore recommends that the best way to ensure a lasting peace in contested border areas is for governments to encourage local communities on both sides to work together to find solutions that are acceptable to everyone. The study concludes that member States should emplace coordinated security monitoring against pastoralist migrations, locust incursions, terrorist activities, and information sharing with relevant authorities.

Keywords: Early warning, Conflict Management, Conflict Prevention, Security Architecture

Introduction

In order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the AU, in 2002, established also a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). The Protocol established that the information gathered by the CEWS supports the efforts of the Chairperson of the Commission to "timeously advise the PSC on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action" (AU, 2002b).

The CEWS consists of an observation and monitoring center (the *Situation Room*), and observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms, linked directly to the CEWS (AU 2002b). The Situation Room is located at the Conflict Management Division (CMD) of the AU Peace and Security Department in

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Addis Ababa. It is responsible for data collection and analysis based on an appropriate early warning indicators module. The observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room (AU, 2002b).

The first part of this paper is a literature review on precursory indicators. The most cutting-edge early warning systems are compared and categorised according to their successes and failures, and their value to policymakers evaluated. The study evaluated African Union's Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa's (IGAD) in line with their roles on South Sudan conflict. While potential benefits of EWR mechanism was highlighted in the concluding section.

Literature Review

African Peace and Security Architecture

Franke (2008) writing from the constructivists' perspective, argues that the emergence of African Peace and Security architecture and its institutional layer can best be described by the concept of multilayered security community. Furthermore, he described a security community as a group of states integrated to the point where people have dependable expectation of peaceful change. Distinguishing between an alliance and security community he argued that contrary to an alliance, a pluralistic security community is held together by the notion of collective identity and, more specifically, by shared values and meaning rather than merely the perceived need to balance a common threat.

His views suggests that African Peace and Security Architecture are designed by the notion of collective identity of African states rather than the need to balance threat, although threat balance will be accomplished by the architecture. He further argues that a transnational or collective Identity develops in the course of sustained interaction between states and through the development of dependable behavior and common norms, eventually leads to the emergence of a transnational community characterized by mutual trust and sense of affiliation.

On the origin of African peace and Security architecture Franke argues that, peace and security frame work is relatively new in African discourse. According to him, at first glance, neither the concept of security communities nor any other concepts of security cooperation currently in academic discourse seem applicable to African emerging security architecture. His argument being that scholar rather described African states with the impression of quasi-Hobbesian anarchical society with the degree of violent conflict that characterized the continent in recent time. Thus, African society falls short in the category of security community based on communality of values. Hence, he argued that African history of security cooperation is none the less exasperating.

Franke (2010) in tracing the history of collective security mechanism for African argues that the idea of a community security in Africa can be traced to the colonial era and the struggle for independence, which majored in the discussion for establishment of the OAU in 1963. Kwame Nkrumah a leading voice for African Unity advocated for Africa High Command (AHC) which was a collective security mechanism, but this was not taken as the group who favoured a gradual process towards Uniting Africa influenced the establishment of the OAU in 1963. However, he submits that the post-cold war development in African led to a rethinking on developing mechanism for peace and security. As African began to experience the negative impact of globalization, and the waning of interest from the super powers which they enjoyed during the cold war politics. The new wave of cooperative Pan-Africanism evolved. This new wave was characterized by a shift from regime security and sovereignty which was available during OAU days to a human security.

Franke opines that the awareness of the negative effect of unconditional insistence on the status quo of the OAU, inspired leaders like Olusegun Obasajo of Nigeria and Yoweli Museveni of Uganda to call for a redefinition of security and sovereignty as a pre-condition for the continent's development. Hence, the shift from non-interference to non-indifference underlying this sentiment grew stronger as humanitarian catastrophes happened in places like Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia among others which overshadowed any progress made in the continent. Forced into action, the continent's leaders were increasingly ready to overcome the conceptual hurdles that had prevented meaningful and effective cooperation in the past Franke submitted. Furthermore he opines that it was in this atmosphere of collective – imagination and collective identity formation that colonial Muammar Ghaddafi's radical reform proposals triggered the replacement of OAU and the establishment of the African Union (AU).

As argued by Maloka (2001), this new found readiness and the emergence hopes for an African Renaissance. This idealistic undercurrent found expression in renewed interest in African institutions and African solutions to African problems and eventually paved the way for a reappraisal of continental unity. As a result of this, the structural and institutional weaknesses of the OAU came to the fore and the need for a reform became obvious.

Two important books emerged in 2010: Ulf Engel and Gomes Porto (2010); and, Hany Besada (2010). Both books assess African regional security arrangements with its evolving peace and security architecture. The book provides an informed and critical analysis of the operationalization and institutionalization of the APSA. The authors recognize that the political, institutional and normative processes that underpin the transformation of the OAU into the AU have the potential to transform the way the continent addresses the

challenges of security. However, they assume there are many risks and the implementation and successful actualization of the APSA are not assured. They reveal three interrelated challenges:

- (1) The individual interests of Member States and of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) may reveal 'self-help' strategies, which directly contradict the norms agreed upon and may hinder APSA's institutional developments;
- (2) Is the continuing violation by several Member States of fundamental principles such as the sanctity of human life and respect of human rights, democratic practices and good governance, rule of law and protection of fundamental freedoms; these non-compliances will certainly require constant monitoring; and
- (3) The institutionalization of the APSA has revealed serious capacity deficits. In a context where organizational development, training, and additional recruitment of staff are urgent, the questions on the sustainability of the APSA are many (Engel & Porto, 2010).

Besada et al. (2010) provides an overview of the peace and security challenges facing the African continent, with topics ranging from integration methods, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), and responsibility to protect (R2P) to peace building, peacekeeping, and the APSA. It does not identify an overall conclusion of the arguments presented in the twelve chapters, but present useful insights about each of these issues. Most relevant for this thesis is the topic about *African Solutions for African Problems* and the one about *Hope and Challenges for the APSA*. Regarding African solutions for African problems, the authors argue that difficult security problems, be they practical or normative in kind, require complex solutions.

In order to find widespread approval and improvement of top-down security means, more emphasis should be given to prevention, actual analysis of roots of conflicts on the ground, as well as incorporation of systemic causes in the overall assessment and solution-finding process. This would imply not only scrutinizing the problems and actors of actual host countries, but also the programs and actions of international organizations and actors. The authors also argue that it seems important for the APSA to further strengthen and expand the continental and sub-regional organizations to bridge the general divide between self-reliance and further internationalization of security. They would provide for regional and continental alternatives in form of organizations that reliably serve as building blocks within the international peace and security arena, enhance (e.g. AU and peer review mechanism) continental collaboration and coordination in security questions by providing for continuity and a (preventive) diplomacy platform, and strengthen the continent's own role concerning norm creation and diffusion (Besada et al., 2010).

Concerning the hope and challenges for the APSA, the authors provide a short overview of the APSA mechanisms and point to the encouraging decrease in the number of wars and greater prosperity and stability many States in the region have shown. They note that progress has been made. However, they argue that the lack of State capacity, coordination, resources, and the AU's unwillingness to confront fellow leaders among others, means that Africa has not operationalized its peace and security architecture. Further integration between the AU and UN is the primary recommendation as the way forward for the AU (Besada et al., 2010).

Cilliers (2008) in an article titled the *African Standby Force (ASF)*, argues that strategically the lack of adequate financial resources and the lack of capacity at the level of the AU are the two major obstacles for the operationalization of the ASF and, consequently, of the APSA. He presented some structural problems, such as the lack of coordination and engagement between the AU and the five regions. In addition, he argued that the development of some systems, like logistics, training, command and control are based on political and not on practical considerations. Arguably, he wrote that some African partners (European and Americans) have seized on the ASF concept to such a degree that it sometimes undermines African ownership. This is most pronounced in West and East Africa, where the number of officers seconded from donor countries to training, planning, and regional structures are rapidly outnumbering their African compatriots. For Cilliers, that is not appropriate and the "AU and the various regions should ensure that they assume ownership and drive donor support and not the other way around" (Cilliers, 2008).

Cilliers also wrote about the *Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)* in 2005. He provided an overview of CEWS essential characteristics as a continental system, presented a brief history of the development of this system, and explained the key differences between intergovernmental early warning and national intelligence systems. Cilliers offers two major conclusions: the first was that the functioning of the early warning system should be insulated from executive influence and any formal engagement with national intelligence agencies. The second conclusion was that early warning systems, at whatever level, should develop a methodologically sound, but simple and clear system for ongoing monitoring to help establish a baseline for conflict analysis. For Cilliers, conflict prevention is a much cheaper and more appropriate role for the African Union than conflict intervention and in this context, the role of the CEWS is central (Cilliers, 2008).

Powell, (2005'14) argues that the AU's emerging security architecture places the continental organization within a robust security system consisting of African regional arrangements and mechanisms, the United Nations (UN), and other key members of the international community. Yet there are a number of challenges

confronting African regional organizations and their efforts to fulfill a peace and security mandate. These include questionable legitimacy, resource and capacity constraints, and conflicting political agendas. Donor initiatives may further exacerbate these broad differences inasmuch as they focus on certain regions over others and support regional organizations with overlapping membership. Ultimately, however, the AU and the rest of the international community will need to use a range of tools to deliver on the new peace and security agenda in Africa. Political initiatives to prevent, manage, and resolve conflict need to be matched with strategies on the part of national, regional and international actors to address the social and political vulnerabilities at the root of conflict (Powell, 2005).

These informed views, expert opinions, and academic are vital to construct an informed opinion and to understand the strategic contours of the APSA. Numerous research organizations worldwide have also published several papers about some of the topics involving the APSA. However, it is possible to identify in all these sources generalized opinions about the APSA development. They include resource and capacity constraints, conflicting political agendas and difficulties in coordination between the continental level (of the AU) and regional level (of the RECs), but also the finding that relevant progress has been made and the belief that the AU has the potential to transform the way the continent addresses the challenges of security.

As one can perceive, the security challenges that Africans face are not easy to address. They are complex and represent an important obstacle for African security and development, requiring comprehensive approaches and strategies, at the continental and the regional level, with the support of other partners. The role of the AU is vital in coordinating and developing the security mechanisms. Therefore, it is fundamental to review thematically the official documents of the AU, which will provide the adequate paradigm to analyze the strategic importance of the APSA.

Early Warning Response

Austin (2004) defined an early warning system from an academic perspective as: ‘any initiative that focuses on systematic data collection, analysis and/or formulation of recommendations, including risk assessment and information sharing, regardless of topic, whether they are quantitative, qualitative or a blend of both. Within early warning, three components can be differentiated; (1) estimating the magnitude and timing of relative risks of emerging threats, (2) analyzing the nature of these threats and describing plausible scenarios, and (3) communicating warning analyses to decision makers. (Woocher, 2008) Early response, accordingly, means: ‘any initiative that occurs in the latent stages of a perceived potential armed conflict with the aim at reduction, resolution or transformation. The term mechanism will refer to the individual units of an E[arly] W[arning] S[ystem] such as data collection, data formatting, data analysis

with the understanding that there is a relationship and process between these unities for the system to operate.’ (Austin, 2004) A crucial, yet so far mainly under-reflected, issue is the question of who is going to be warned and who is supposed to act upon this warning. A well-established definition (Dorn, 2004) sees early warning as ‘the act of alerting a recognized authority (such as the UN Security Council) to a new (or renewed) threat to peace at a sufficiently early stage’ (Campbell & Meier, 2007). But is the ideal of primarily addressing a ‘recognised authority’ a meaningful and sufficient criterion? As Barrs (2006) rightly states, we ‘typically ‘wire’ that warning toward ourselves so we can take action. But we have given much less thought to also warning those who are about to be attacked.’

Thus, the underlying assumptions of most early warning systems is that international actors will take over responsibility as protectors as soon as adequate information is being processed along with rules and procedures for initiating appropriate action at the level of an international or regional organisation (Barrs, 2006). These assumptions, however, have so far not 4 been confirmed in practice. Accordingly, Barrs has proposed ‘to focus more effort on a warning capacity within the killing grounds’ (Barrs, 2006). Such an approach could facilitate the reduction or even overcoming of the gap between early warning and early response. Efficient EWR systems can tackle various threats to human security, such as: a) wars and armed conflict; b) state failure; c) genocide and politicicide; d) other gross human rights violations; and e) humanitarian emergencies caused by natural disasters.

In the following we primarily focus on the related threats to the categories a) to c) for which we use, mainly in accordance with the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), the umbrella term ‘political instability. These are also the types of conflict in which a prevention role is expected from regional organisations. Relying on the definitions used by the Human Security Center (2005; 2006), we can define ‘wars’ as forms of collective violence in which one of the parties involved is a government and which result in more than 1,000 battle-related deaths per year. Armed conflicts include collective violence beyond the threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths as well as ‘non-state’ forms of political violence between warlords, militias, guerrillas, and other organised groups. ‘State failure’ means that a state can hardly perform its core functions, such as maintaining a legitimate monopoly of force, guaranteeing the rule of law, opening channels for political participation, securing basic needs and implementing political decisions through administrative acts.

Genocides and politicicides, as defined by Barbara Harff, ‘are the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents--or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities--that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal, political, or politicized

ethnic group. In genocides the victimized groups are defined by their perpetrators primarily in terms of their communal characteristics.

In politicides, in contrast, groups are defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant groups.’ (Harff 2003) EWR mechanisms in this sense are a part of an overall crisis-prevention architecture, but this is not the same as conflict or crisis prevention. Adelman (2008) argued: ‘E[arly] W[arning] is intended to detect rising tensions headed towards violent conflict and, therefore, is complementary to conflict prevention when it focuses on tensions that are already rising but has little to do with preventing tensions from rising at all. (...) E[arly] W[arning] does include not only the gathering of data but the analysis of that data to develop strategic options for response but does not include the responses themselves which come under conflict prevention.’ In the more recent literature other classifications are used, differentiating between:

- a. Operational prevention – short-term efforts using political or military means to prevent a conflict or forestall escalating violence;
- b. Structural prevention – efforts through developmental or economic tools to address the root causes of conflict, aiming at risk reduction and to call for better regulatory frameworks;
- c. Systemic prevention – tries to reduce conflict on a global basis and goes beyond mechanisms focused on any particular state (Rubin & Jones, 2007).

Structural and systemic prevention both target underlying causes of conflict with a mid- to long-term perspective. However, they could be inadequate in an upcoming or even acute crisis that requires early action. Thus, study primarily concentrate on response mechanisms within the category of operational prevention, ‘which seeks to contain or reverse the escalation of violent conflict by using the tools of preventive diplomacy, economic sanctions and/or incentives, and/or military force’ (Campbell & Meier, 2007).

Categorising Early Warning and Response Systems despite growing skepticism in the policy and donor communities, papers and publications on early warning research and EWR have experienced an upsurge within the last two years (Marshall 2008; Goldstone 2008; Meier 2007; Barton et al., 2008). The review studies use different ways to categorise the broad spectrum of EWR models:

- In ‘Early Warning: A Review of Conflict Prediction Models and Systems’, Barton et al., 2008 cluster 30 models that try to predict conflict or instability according to the sectors from which they stem: a) national government models; b) international and regional organisation models; c) academic, NGO and think-tank models; and d) private models;

• Nyheim (2008) undertook a ‘Mapping of Early Warning and Response Systems’ for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee. In his overview and critical appraisal he differentiated between quantitative and qualitative systems, as well as between early warning models and policy tools.

Verstegen (1999) introduced four ideal type models: a) ‘correlation models’ focus on structural indicators and try to relate causal models from empirical research to future outbreaks of violence; b) ‘sequential models’ filter accelerators in order to understand when particular events lead to worsening a crisis situation; c) ‘conjunctural models’ look at escalation scenarios and inductively establish what factor combinations and thresholds lead to violence; and d) ‘response models’ try to identify windows of opportunity for early and effective intervention in crisis situations.

Finally, Marshall (2008) classifies the 21 early warning models in his review according to three types: a) conditional and causal models deal with empirical evidence for causal interference between independent variables and violent conflict/political instability. They are of crucial importance for predictive models as they help to identify valid indicators (Marshall 2008: 9); b) predictive models try to forecast the outbreak of violence in a time span of one to five years. They focus on selected variables and in most cases not only include structural variables, but also process indicators or event-based information (Marshall 2008: 10); and c) general risk and capacity models are used ‘to rank countries from weak to strong, building on the general association between weakness, social problems, political conflict, and poor state performance’ (Marshall 2008).

We find Marshall’s differentiation most useful since it focuses on the aims of the models that make them more comparable. The study thus adopt Marshall’s categories, albeit with two specifications:

- a. in order to keep the vast amount of 6 general risk and assessment models under control we divide them between those which aim at rankings or performance ratings and those which aim at targeted intervention (Verstegen’s ‘response model’);
- b. We add in-depth investigative research and intelligence as an important additional category – a qualitative component that Marshall neglects, but which is regarded as highly valuable by practitioners as well as country and area specialists.

This study hereby list five major causal models:

- a) Five predictive models (mainly run by the PITF);
- b) A dozen institutions that rank and rate states according to their risks and capacities;

- c) About twenty efforts to integrate risk and capacity assessments into early response models;
- d) Several private companies, NGOs and government agencies that offer or use investigative case study research; and
- e) Intelligence for early warning. Selected EWR Models, Tools and Mechanisms What are the assumptions underlying the different early warning projects? Which methodologies are used?

Within these five categories we have singled out one prominent example of each in order to illustrate how these models, tools and mechanisms work, namely:

- a) The World Bank's greed model of rebellion;
- b) The PITF's global and sub-Saharan model;
- c) The Fragile States Index (FSI);
- d) The Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) of Carleton University; and
- e) The International Crisis Group's (ICG) Crisis Watch – probably the most reputed and frequent alert system based on qualitative investigative research and 'NGO intelligence'.

Table 1: Early warning and response with regard to violent conflict and state fragility – selected models, tools and mechanisms

Institution / Lead Researchers Classification	a. Name of the Model b. URL Link c. Major publications (e.g. Fearon/Laitin 2003)
A. Conditional and Causal Factor Models (with predictive qualities/implications)	
(1) World Bank Development Research Group and Oxford University / Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler ACAD, IGO	a. Greed model of rebellion (opportunity structures) b. http://econ.worldbank.org/programs/conflict c. Collier/Hoeffler 1998; Collier/Hoeffler 2004a; Collier/Hoeffler 2004b
B. Predictive Models	
(2) Political Instability Task Force, Center for Global Policy / Monty G. Marshall ACAD	a. PITF global model PITF African Instability model b. http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfp5.htm c. Goldstone et al. 2005
C. Risk and Capacity Assessments (Rankings and Performance Ratings)	
(3) The Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy ACAD, NGO	a. Failed States Index, based on the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) b. http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140 c. Fund for Peace 2008
D. Risk and Capacity Assessments with Early Response Component (event analysis)	
(4) Carleton University, Canadian Government / Gerald Cosette ACAD, GOV	a. Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) b. http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/ c. Country Indicators for Foreign Policy 2008
E. Crisis Watch Lists based on Investigative Case Study Research or Intelligence	
(5) International Crisis Group, Belgium PRIV	a. Crisis Watch b. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1200&l=1

Source: Barton and von Hippel (2008)

Theoretical Framework

Many explanations for ethnic unrest, civil strife, and failed states are actively competing. Among of the most well-known are the Horizontal Inequality Model (Fearon & Laitin, 2003), the Greed/Opportunity Structure Model (Collier & Hoeffler, 2001), and the Minority Risk Project (Adelmann, 1998). Valid indications for risk and capability evaluations, and occasionally the focus of attention within investigative research and intelligence, have been greatly influenced by all of these models. It has become increasingly challenging to maintain and justify EWR systems that do not account for the results of sophisticated causal models. Yet, the fact that the results of causal models are debated remains a challenge. Perhaps the much criticised (Marchal 2004; Nathan 2005; Suhrke et al. 2005) greed model of rebellion proposed by Collier and Hoeffler can serve as a theoretical framework for this paper.

This model incorporates the significant correlation between civil conflict and low GDP per capita (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002). Nonetheless, the model contends that opportunities for organising a military uprising are more important than 'grievance' in sparking outbreaks of violence. According to this theory, a state's inability to raise its citizens' standard of living could indicate that it lacks the resources to effectively police its own area (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). In addition, it is simple to recruit young males due to a lack of competition in the job market and formal schooling (Collier & Hoeffler, 2001). Rebels may be able to fund their operations with help from outside, the sale of stolen goods, or the regulation of raw material exports (Azam, 2002). The 'conventional purpose of war, to destroy the enemy military, is substituted within this economic model by commercially driven interests in ongoing conflict and the institutionalism of violence at what is clearly a profitable level of intensity,' as noted by Mats Berdal and David Malone (2000).

Because of this, primary commodity exports (Collier & Hoeffler 2001) became an important indicator for crisis prevention and early warning, since they may be used to "fuel war" (Le Billon, 2005). Specifically, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) argued that if a country's GDP is based on exports of primary commodities and those exports account for more than 30 percent of GDP, then that country is three times more likely to experience violence than one in which exports of primary commodities account for less than 10 percent of GDP.

The Use Early Warning in South Sudan

Continental Early Warning (CEWARN) was established by the seven IGAD member states to better serve the Horn of Africa. According to Von Keyserlingk and Kopfmüller (2006), CEWARN's goal is to "receive and disseminate information concerning potentially violent conflicts, as well as their breakout and escalation throughout the IGAD region." CEWARN's mandate includes the ability to foresee potential sources of conflict, hence the organisation draws from both predictive and risk assessment models.

CEWARN used a gradual approach by concentrating only on two pastoralist conflicts at first because of the numerous acute inter- and intra-state conflicts in the region. The ultimate goal of this reporting initiative is to cover all violent conflicts in the realm of human security.

Specifically, CEWARN began its work in two pilot areas on pastoral conflicts in the cross-border regions of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan, and in the second cross-border regions of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia. This was accomplished by establishing a network of field monitors, country coordinators, national research institutes, and conflict-EWR units at the national level. The 52 socio-political indicators used by CEWARN are split between two report types: (1) Violent Incident Reports, which include indicators on armed clashes, raids, protest demonstrations, and other crimes; and (2) indicators for reports on the presence and status of communal relations, civil society activities, economic activities, governance and media, natural disasters, safety and security, and social services (see Appendix 1). The results of CEWARN have been, in IGAD's opinion,

CEWARN has accomplished the following:

- i. It has become a sub-regional mechanism with the most developed data-based regional early warning system in Africa;
- ii. It has developed an effective state-of-the-art field monitoring and dataanalysis tool;
- iii. It has revealed a previously unrecognised extent of violence in the pilot pastoralist areas;
- iv. It has conducted capacity building for conflict prevention, management, and response in the region through skill training of stakeholders at a variety of levels CEWARN is aware of various persistent implementation deficiencies, such as a weak data foundation and an insufficient reaction mechanism.

CEWARN and IGAD both have limited resources and funds. Few people work in the headquarters clearing house. At the current planning horizon, it is expected that all member states will report on pastoral conflicts (2007- 2011). Whether or not CEWARN operations will expand to cover other types of conflict is still something IGAD needs to decide.

In South Sudan, Ceasefire is working to improve civil society's capacity for early warning and preventative advocacy in the face of identity-based violence. Since December 2013, Nuer forces loyal to then-Vice President RiekMachar and the Dinka-led forces of President SalvaKiirMayardit have been at odds in South Sudan's ongoing identity-based conflict. Most of the people in South Sudan have been affected by the conflict, which has resulted in repeated community splits along ethnic and tribal lines. Rape has reached

"grotesque levels," according to the UN Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, putting not only women and girls in peril but also men. Armed forces on both sides of the conflict have enlisted children as soldiers. Nearly 4.3 million people, or a third of the population, were internally displaced or externally displaced as of mid-May 2018, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA).

There have been several agreements to end the fighting, but it hasn't stopped. Part II of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities contains provisions for the protection of civilians, and this project aims to advance those provisions as well as other commitments made in the ARCSS.

In order to better protect civilians and provide early warning of identity-based violence, civil society activists play a crucial role. Check out the CEPO database for tracking bloodshed in wars. International actors' capacity to conduct monitoring activities on the ground is severely hampered by security concerns and access restrictions. In addition, early warning information doesn't always make it to the right people, and preventing violations against civilians is currently a low priority for armed forces focused on ending the conflict.

The violence in South Sudan, however, is typically of a low-tech nature. The United Nations, the African Union, and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, along with influential governments, have made protecting civilians' rights a priority, making it harder for national and local authorities and armed opposition groups to ignore violations and increasing the pressure on them to act. Participants in this endeavour include:

The Juba-based Community Empowerment for Progress Organization is a prominent non-governmental organisation in South Sudan. CEPO is supported by a broad coalition of South Sudanese activists engaged in peacekeeping and other humanitarian efforts across the country. The UK Department for International Development and its aid arm, UK Aid Direct, are funding this endeavour. South Sudanese stakeholders, alarmed by the rising frequency of violence within the country's communities, decided on Tuesday to create an early warning and response strategy for potential conflicts.

The IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) was established in 2002, and its high level technical policy organs made the decision to adopt a seven-year strategy (2012-2019) in 2011.

CholLuot, chairperson of the South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission (SSPRC), spoke at the beginning of the two-day meeting, saying that the SSPRC is thrilled to be part of the plan to adopt the seven-year strategy and that it will fully support IGAD in its efforts to successfully implement the conflict early warning and early response initiative. "The current crisis in South Sudan calls for the immediate

establishment of early warning systems. When it comes to reducing and preventing conflicts in South Sudan, my commission, the South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission, will provide full support to IGAD and its partners "What he had to say was.

In order to lessen territorial-related or land-based disputes, the chairperson of the South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission (SSPRC) and head of South Sudan's newly established Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Unit (CEWERU) stressed the critical importance of conflict early warning systems in border states. CEWARN director Martin Kimani argued that all community members should be actively engaged in early warning systems because they are a direct approach to governance through conflict prevention. "The success of the early warning and early response strategy will entirely depend on how well the citizen understands conflict, its causes, and how to prevent it from society," Kimani said.

According to information obtained by Sudan Tribune, the new strategy will have a broader thematic and geographic scope, including new areas of reporting in Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and other member states. Food insecurity, environmental degradation, climate instability, and migration-related conflicts will all be tracked and addressed thanks to CEWARN. Kimani claims that CEWARN has developed its new strategy plan from the ground up, putting a premium on the input and input of local communities and their knowledge of the dynamics of cross-border peace and security.

Additionally, "the plan is intended to build on CEWARN's experience and strength in informing national and regional conflict early warning, response, and peace building practises and linking them with local practise," he explained. Kimani claims that IGAD has devised a Rapid Response Fund (RRF) to facilitate swift responses to emergencies before the involvement of key actors like governments. The RRF will be used to sponsor negotiations. Sometimes these funds can be used to set up a water project for communities, but it's important to get input from the communities themselves about what they need first.

The director of CEWARN described the RRF as "modest," adding that South Sudan, as IGAD's newest member, stands to learn a great deal from the other countries and has the potential to become the "leading" nation in conflict prevention and peace. After the devastating civil wars in Rwanda and other African countries, several nations, including Sudan, signed a protocol in 2002 aimed at preventing future outbreaks of violence. Nonetheless, South Sudan has begun its conflict prevention process, as shown by the successful launch of its early warning and early response unit under the SSPRC just last month.

Conclusion and Recommendations

It is remarkable how many different EWR models exist. However, there is a lot of duplication and overlap of effort due to the large number of different data collections, conflict predictions, and assessments. Data collection methods have advanced significantly, as have those for locating pertinent indicators and making conflict forecasts. The PITF's developed predictive models, for instance, appear to have had great success in recent years (Marshall, 2008). Members of the PITF claim that the accuracy of their quantitative models has increased dramatically and is now around 85%. Goldstone (2008) argues that combining these quantitative models with qualitative models based on structural analogies and patterns discovered in case study research can further improve the overall accuracy of prediction. Combining quantitative analysis based on indicators and events with qualitative/configurative analysis that draws on structural analogies and "common patterns" across cases has the potential to improve early warning accuracy by as much as 90 percent.

Among the most pressing issues facing the IGAD region are those related to conflict early warning, such as youth unemployment, poorly managed electoral processes, ethnic polarisation, competition over land and natural resources, the effects of COVID-19, and extreme climate fluctuations. Climate change and environmental challenges, such as prolonged drought, floods, and unexpected events like the 2020 locust invasion, exacerbate conflict early warning issues related to food security. To mitigate the syndrome, this paper recommends that:

- i. In the event that national elections are called for, the member states will collaborate with a newly formed joint regional electoral commission to ensure that the process is moving forward in a way that satisfies certain minimum requirements.
- ii. The United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (UNATT, 2014) is a multilateral treaty that regulates the international trade in conventional weapons and must be signed and ratified by all IGAD member states to address the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.
- iii. The best way to ensure a lasting peace in contested border areas is for governments to encourage local communities on both sides to work together to find solutions that are acceptable to everyone.
- iv. Pastoralist migrations, locust incursions, terrorist activities, and information sharing with relevant authorities all necessitate coordinated security monitoring.
- v. Redesigning the educational system to incorporate more vocational training is essential to reducing youth unemployment. Youth involvement in peace building and policy formulation processes, as well as incentives for productive sectors like industry and services to offer internship programmes, can provide crucial support.

- vi. Because of the reality of climate change, it is critical to strengthen campaigns encouraging communities to accept government policies on environmental protection programmes, as well as equip meteorological and disaster management institutions to issue earlier forecasts.
- vii. Dispute-prone and even violent communities can learn to live together and develop mutually beneficial interdependence through regional social cohesion programmes like the provision of shared social services and other socioeconomic amenities.

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